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Abstract
Several studies showed the prevalence and pervasiveness of user tracking
and fingerprinting on the Internet. Since most tracking methods rely on
JavaScript, some recent works proposed HTML/JavaScript code analysis
as the most effective way to reliably detect user tracking and fingerprinting.
The research hypothesis of this project is that web tracking is becoming ob-
fuscated, and previous detection methods based on static code analysis are
becoming ineffective and very easy to evade. The objective of this project is
to develop a framework based on dynamic code analysis to track the actual
calls made to the browser JavaScript API and compare them to the original
HTML/JavaScript code in order to detect obfuscated fingerprinting. We
will perform a broad analysis of the actual deployment of obfuscated web
tracking on the Internet, and release the resulting framework and datasets
to the web research community under an Open Source license.1
1The source code and the gathered data can be found at https://bitbucket.org/
aespuna/canvas-tfg
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1 Introduction
This chapter contextualizes the project reviewing the current state of web
tracking and some JavaScript obfuscation techniques. It also explains the
motivation of the work and presents the structure used on the whole doc-
ument.
1.1 Context
1.1.1 Web tracking
The prevalence of user tracking on the internet is widely known[1]. There
are different techniques, but most of them rely on the use of JavaScript
because it can be executed in the browser and can be easily deployed. The
principal method consists in generating some kind of digital fingerprint [2]
on the client side to uniquely identify the user, allowing the service to track
their movements on the web.
The current JavaScript API[3], implemented by most modern browsers,
allows to programatically obtain a lot of information about the client ma-
chine. Parameters such as operative system, platform, installed fonts, or
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screen dimensions among others can be easily extracted executing simple
function calls.
One notable technique is called canvas fingerprinting. The idea is to
use a hidden HTML5 canvas element [4], draw some elements using specific
fonts, text and shapes, and then produce a raw image using the toDataURL
method[5]. The corresponding rendered value depends heavily on the client
hardware and software and can generate a digital fingerprint (hence the
name) that can be used to almost uniquely identify the user.
Figure 1.1: This webpage has correctly guessed our user-agent using canvas
fingerprinting, even after spoofing our User-Agent HTTP header
Because of how HTTP works, most of the time this data is gathered
without the user noticing or without giving explicit consent.
Tracking can also happen when automatically requesting resources from
other domains (such as images, scripts or frames) using the HTTP Referer
Header and already set cookies.
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To allow inter-domain tracking, that heavily reduces the users’ privacy,
there are services offered by third party companies that work by deliber-
ately including some HTML element (most of the time a JavaScript snip-
pet) to the first party server response [6].
The gathered information constitutes the core business of several in-
ternet advertising companies. They can use it for targeting ads, price dis-
crimination [7] [8] [9], assessing health conditions or even assessing financial
credibility[10] [11].
This kind of tracking is not only considered a threat to users’ privacy,
in some cases it can generate performance issues on the visited website,
degrading user experience.
1.1.2 Code obfuscation
Code obfuscation is the process of modifying the source code so it is very
difficult to read by a human and consequently reason about it. Since
JavaScript must be delivered in its source code form, not in binary form,
some content providers obfuscate it to protect it from being understood by
others. This way it is more difficult to reuse it, modify it, and sometimes
it even helps to prevent copyright violations[12].
Obfuscation must not be confused with minification. Minification tries
to reduce the code size (e.g. mangling variable names, avoiding new lines,
removing unnecessary spaces), while obfuscation tries to hide the inten-
tion of the code. Sometimes obfuscation can lead to code minification or
viceversa, but technically they are different concepts.
There are a lot of both free and non-free online tools for obfuscating
JavaScript source code[13][14][15][16][17].
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function divide_by_two(value) {
var y = value/2;
return y;
};
divide_by_two(2);
// minified
function f(a){return a/2};f(2)
// obfuscated 1: we can still see the function name
// but it's not near the actual call
eval(function(p,a,c,k,e,d){while(c--){if(k[c]){p=p.replace(new
RegExp('\\b'+c+'\\b','g'),k[c])}}return p}('4 3(0){5
1=0/2;6
1};3(2);',7,7,'value|y||divide_by_two|function|var|return'.split('|')))
↪→
↪→
↪→
// obfuscated 2: divide_by_two doesn't appear
// but the function exists with the same name after
execution↪→
var a={}, b
=["\x64\x69\x76\x69\x64\x65\x5f\x62\x79\x5f\x74\x77\x6f"];a[b[0]]
= function(c){return c/2;};a[b[0]](2);
↪→
↪→
Figure 1.2: Simple example of code minification and obfuscation
The dynamic nature of JavaScript allows to fuse strings with code very
easily. Using the eval function on a XORed string with a key, is one of
the most used techniques.
One can even hide the eval call using the Function constructor like
[18]
[]["sort"]["constructor"](CODE)()
Other simpler options include writing the strings simply as hex encoded
strings (as the last example in Figure 1.2).
As we can see in Figure 1.2 static code analysis would be useless on
obfuscated code.
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Our line in differentiating both minification and obfuscation will be
JavaScript API name mangling. Minification will not rename public func-
tion and variable names, because otherwise the browser would not recognise
them. So, if a public function call is being executed without the name being
present, it will be considered obfuscation. Otherwise it is just minification.
1.2 State of the art
There are multiple studies and tools around web tracking. Both to perform
it, and to protect against it.
In this section we will describe some previous work around web tracking
detection and analysis.
There have been some efforts to use software solutions to protect users’
privacy on the internet. Most of them take the form of web browser plugins.
Notable examples are NoScript [19] (a JavaScript blocker), AdBlock [20]
and uBlock [21] (block requests to known domains used for tracking and
advertising), and RequestPolicy [22] and Ghostery [23] (block requests to
external non-trusted domains). These plugins do not try to detect tracking
on the fly, they just basically read user preferences to blacklist some of the
content.
1.2.1 Static analysis
There have also been some studies to find malware using static analysis
of JavaScript code [24] [25]. It works by analyzing the code and trying to
find fragments of it that are used to track web users. Using heuristics and
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other classification techniques it determines with only static patterns if it
is malware or not.
Detecting malware is a different problem than detecting canvas finger-
printing, but some of this techniques would be applicable.
Some previous research tried to detect code obfuscation automatically
statically analyzing the source code [26]. They found that there exists only
a weak correlation between malware and JavaScript code obfuscation or
minification.
An static analysis approach to search canvas fingerprinting JavaScript
function calls would not work if the code is obfuscated, so we will have to
execute the JavaScript to really know which are the side effects.
The research hypothesis of this project is that web tracking is becoming
obfuscated using tools such as the ones used in Figure 1.2. Because this
code transformations happen during execution, previous work using static
analysis to detect web tracking are becoming ineffective and very easy to
evade.
1.2.2 Dynamic analysis
We have to differentiate between dynamic analysis of obfuscation and dy-
namic analysis of tracking.
We don’t consider dynamic analysis of obfuscation because it is mostly
trivial. Once the code has been evaluated, there is no obfuscation. We
would only need to compare gobal table symbols after parsing and after
evaluating.
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On the other hand, dynamic analysis of tracking has not been widely
used. After this project started, a mass scale online tracking measurement
was done[27].
They didn’t take into account obfuscation, but they analyzed a lot of the
currently used techniques for tracking, with a framework they opensourced[28].
Those techniques go from different forms of fingerprinting (canvas, Web-
RTC, fonts, etc) to analyzing third party and cookie usage.
We will try to validate their work using our own implementation of a
canvas fingerprinting detection framework, but we will take into account
obfuscation deployment.
1.3 Personal motivation
As a internet user I’m worried about the state of tracking on the internet.
Not only the reasons behind it but also how most users are completely
unaware of it. Learning how the main tracking techniques work, how are
they being implemented and how to prevent them it’s a reason good enough
to take the project.
I am also worried about an obfuscated web. With WebAssembly, al-
though it will increase performance and it will allow developers to program
in different languages than JavaScript, users won’t be able too look at the
guts of what’s being executed on their own browser. I personally believe
in the open web so people can tinker and come up with different solutions
and approaches to an already solved problem.
I was interested also in undertanding better how a browser works in
a more fundamental basis. The JavaScript engine of a modern browser
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is really a feat of engineering, composed of a lot of complex parts. The
interpreter, the JIT compiler, the optimizer, . . . I expect to learn a lot
about them during this project.
1.4 Report structure
This document is separated in multiple chapters, each of them answering
a different set of questions:
Scope of the project Presentation of the objectives and explanation of
the required knowledge and competences. What are we expecting to
do and what not?
Planning How will we distribute the required tasks and budget to obtain
our objectives? Will it be sustainable?
Methodology Implementation details of how are we going to achieve our
goals. Description of every software element developed during the
project.
Results and validation After applying our methodology what are the
results? Did we accomplish all the objectives? Can these be consid-
ered correct?
Conclusions Why did we obtain what we obtained? What can be changed
or added on the future so we can improve our results?
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We want to answer if there is obfuscated web tracking on the internet. To
achieve this, there are smaller objectives that need to be completed first.
2.1 Objectives
To reduce the complexity of the project we will only focus on canvas fin-
gerprinting as a tracking method. This is the easiest one to instrument,
and since it uses the toDataURL JavaScript API call, detecting obfuscation
will be also doable.
2.1.1 Main objective
The principal objective of this project is to develop a proof-of-concept
framework for discovering canvas fingerprinting by analizing the actual
calls made to the JavaScript API and comparing them with the original
HTML/JavaScript code. This will unveil the obfuscated uses of canvas
fingerprinting.
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2.1.2 Secondary objectives
Data collection We will create a software tool that will be able to auto-
matically navigate a set of urls and store the results to analize later.
Web service We will create a web service where the user will be able to
input an url and our software will visit that webpage and will provide
information to the user about the tracking and obfuscation detected
on that page. This will help to raise awareness.
Open data We want to be as open as possible. That’s why all the data
and source code will be released to the public using an Open Source
License, so the research community will be able to use it.
2.2 Scope
This project tries to achieve the objectives presented in the section 2.1, but
this project is purely research driven. Our work hypothesis is that there is
obfuscation of tracking on the internet.
If the answer happens to be false, we will still answer the question and
we will try to explain the reasons, so it wouldn’t be cosidered a failure.
In any case the tooling required to determine if a certain website uses
tracking, and if the tracking is obfuscated will be developed, and will be
possible to upgrade it in the future.
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2.3 Useful courses
Some useful courses that I took on my specialization are:
Machine Learning (APA)
The knowledge needed in statistics and probability helped to create
a correct model to classify the websites
Programming Languages (LP) and Compilers (CL)
Knowledge about lexers, parsers and grammars will be very useful
when dealing with the JavaScript and HTML parsing, and finally
Algorithms (A) and Cryptography (C)
Knowledge about hash functions and their implementations helped
in finding alternative solutions to consider unique pages.
Some parts of the project, such as the web service or even programming
the tooling can be considered transversal competences, and probably would
fit better in another specialty. But given that almost all of my optative
credits come from the IT specialization it didn’t come as a problem.
2.4 Competences
As explained in previous sections, this project uses competences associated
to the Computing specialty.
CCO1.2 To demonstrate knowledge about the theoretical fundamentals of
programming languages and the associated lexical, syntactical and se-
mantic processing techniques and be able to apply them to create,
design and process languages.
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We won’t write a javascript engine. But we need to instrument one
to record every call and track the stacktrace, and understanding how
it works is important, so this competence can be considered.
CCO1.3 To define, evaluate and select platforms to develop and produce
hardware and software for developing computer applications and ser-
vices of different complexities.
We have to deal with the browser, which is a complex piece of soft-
ware. We will develop a framework that will use a lot of different
technologies. It will run locally but also in a dedicated server. These
systems are very heterogeneus on platforms and have different re-
quirements.
CCO2.3 To develop and evaluate interactive systems and systems that
show complex information, and its application to solve person-computer
interaction problems.
The cloud service will offer a nice interface for our users. The infor-
mation we will be giving is critical for them, since they want to know
if a certain website is using tracking techniques and moreover if they
are being obfuscated. The way we will present this information is
important.
CCO2.5 To implement information retrieval software.
The core of our system will scrap an important part of the internet
just to answer our initial hypothesis. Our whole framework will be
an automatic information retrieval software.
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2.5 Stakeholders
There are several stakeholders involved in the development of this project,
either directly or indirectly.
Developer Is the same person writing this document. His function is
to develop the choosen methodology, to find or develop the required
tools to achieve the objectives and to validate the obtained results.
Project director The project director is Pere Barlet Ros. His function is
to help the developer giving directions on critical points.
Open source community They provide documentation and tools that
help on the implementation of the framework. They receive the re-
sulting framework as it will be licensed under the MIT License.
Target audience Is both the research community and the average inter-
net user. One objective of this project is to raise awareness about
the ubiquity of internet tracking, and if obfuscation is found, to alert
them.
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3 Planning
The purpose of this section is to describe the division of the project in
smaller tasks. Each task consists of a name, a description, an expected
duration, a set of risks and possible complications, task dependencies, and
nedeed resources.
All this information will be used to construct a viable action plan that
will allow us to finish the project in time, reducing the possibility of failure.
The time planning has been conceived under the assumption that the
project was started on September 10th, 2015 and its original deadline was
January 25th, 2016.
Due to an unexpected oportunity to grow professionally, I had to decide
to park the project for a time. It was this summer that I had enough time
to work the hours that this project required.
At the end, it only added a time shift of about 7 months. So Software
developement and Results and validation phases took the expected time,
but were done 7 months later.
This was a big problem at the begining, but one advantage is that
allowed us to evaluate the work of others[27].
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3.1 Tasks
3.1.1 Project preparation
This task consists of choosing the topic and the director to make the project
suitable for the Computation specialty. It also includes doing all the pa-
perwork required by FIB, to enroll the TFG.
It took some email exchanging with the director during summer and
was already finished at September 14th, 2015.
3.1.2 Project management (GEP) course
This tasks includes a series of smaller tasks that aim to lead the project in
the correct direction. It consists of various deliverables and reading some
provided documentation.
The expected duration was of 120 hours. The risk level was very low
given that the direction was very specific and the schedule was rigid enough.
The only task dependency is the project preparation.
The resources used are primarily software: Atenea virtual campus, Li-
breOffice Writer to complete the auto-evaluation rubrics, and LATEX and
emacs text editor to compose the deliverables.
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3.1.3 Topic research
This task is the first project-specific one. It can be divided in two different
parts:
1. Read code documentation and bibliography to create a JavaScript
tracing framework.
2. Research on various techniques to improve the framework.
This division allowed us to work in a cyclic manner between the software
developement of the first part and the topic research of the second.
The expected duration was 90 hours. The first part was completed in
parallel with GEP. The only risk was not understanding the papers and
spending more time researching for new bibliography.
The resources used were time and internet access.
3.1.4 Approach decision
After researching about different methods to instrument a web browser
or different techniques to classify obfuscated and unobfuscated code, we
need to decide which ones are the best options for us to implement both in
correctness and considering time constraints. This tasks includes meetings
with the director.
The expected duration is 25 hours. The risk is being unable to decide
a clear winner, or choosing the wrong option so it must be corrected later.
No special resources are needed for this task.
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3.1.5 Software developement
This is one of the most important and riskiest tasks. This task will be
an iteration over the framework we aim to develop, improving it iteration
over iteration. The resources used will be two computers (one to develop
software, the other to run the public web server) and a text editor to code.
This task has a dependency on the approach.
The first step would be to make the JavaScript tracing framework, prob-
ably with the aid of a modern web browser Javascript engine. The expected
duration is 40 hours. The risk is being unable to work with the complex-
ity of the code of a modern browser (state of the art JIT compiler, micro
optimizations, etc).
The second step would be to write a program that uses the data col-
lected by the tracing framework so it can determine if there is code obfus-
cation or it is being used for tracking. The more sofisticated we want this
software to be, more time it will take. The expected duration is 60 hours.
This part has a dependency on the approach decision.
A third step would be to create a web service to use the obfuscation
and tracking system remotely. This should be the less riskier part, and the
expected duration is 20 hours.
3.1.6 Results and validation
This task consists of analyzing the data obtained by the framework to
check its correctness manually. This will be used to improve it in future
iterations. This composes a cycle with software development task, but can
be represented linearly. The expected duration is 80 hours.
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3.1.7 Public release
This task consists of releasing the data and results collected and the source
code developed during the project (browser modifications, tools and server)
to the public domain. Some formatting and cleaning up may be needed, to
make it easier to read and use for the community.
The expected duration is of 10 hours. This task has as a dependency
the results and validation task and has low risk.
The resource used will be some code sharing tool such as github.com
or bitbucket.org.
3.1.8 Memory writing
A memory must be written explaining the whole project. Although after
the GEP course, almost a 70% of the memory will be already drafted, there
are some time consuming things remaining such as the final polishment of
already written parts, writing of the technical sections or proof-reading the
whole document multiple times.
The expected duration is of 30 hours. This a very important part of
the project. This task has as prerequisite the results and validation task.
The used resources will be emacs and LATEX.
3.1.9 Oral defense preparation
After the project memory has been delivered, ther is one week before the
oral defense. This task includes preparing sides and practicing the defence.
The expected duration is of 15 hours.
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3.2 Gantt diagram
Figure 3.1: Original Gantt diagram representing all tasks and its depen-
dencies
Figure 3.2: Final adjusted Gantt diagram
3.3 Risks and alternatives
During the project, short after the GEP task finished we experienced an
unexpected major delay. I was offered an opportunity that I wasn’t able
to refuse. This experience helped me to grow both personally and profes-
sionally, but at the cost of having to park the project until this summer.
24
3. Planning 3.4. Budget estimation
At the end it only concurred a general time shift, and both taskwise
duration and total budget were unaffected. The total time of the project
obviously expanded.
However, taskwise, the previous planification still worked. And we had
a plan for every task if a delay was detected, we considered diferent levels
of correction according to the severity:
less than 3 days There is no need to apply correctional measures, as
there is a margin of 2-3 days.
3 to 10 days We increase the daily dedication hours by 10% - 25% until
the deviation for that task is compensated.
more than 10 days We have to rethink and weight how important this
task is. If there are a lot of dependencies we will have to finish this
task no matter what, and then select the most important subsequent
tasks. This could dramatically decrease the quality of the final prod-
uct.
3.4 Budget estimation
We classify resources according to their nature: hardware, software, hu-
man, and utilities. We will see that hardware and software resources have
negligible cost for various reasons, and that the largest part of the budget
falls in the human category.
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3.4.1 Hardware resources
The hardware resources used for this project consist of a laptop for the
developement of the needed code, and a computer that will be used as a
server to run the cloud solution to detect obfuscation.
I will be using my laptop, which I bought for 275e a year ago. This
cost can be excluded from the project as any other computer could serve
the same purpose.
The web service will be hosted in a Virtual Private Server provided by
ovh.es. The economic cost is around 6e per month. We don’t expect to
use a lot of cpu, and since it’s a virtual server, the electrical consumption
will not effectively increase.
The electricity cost might amount to a total of 15e for the duration of
the project, which can be considered negligible.
3.4.2 Software resources
All software used will be free, including but not limited to: Operating
System, text editor, browser, and pdf reader. These programs, are not
only free in price, but also in its licensing.
If developing a browser plugin is required, there’s no need to test it in
other Operative Systems, since the browser provides the required abstrac-
tion.
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For releasing the code to the public, a free cloud platform such as
Github1 or Bitbucket2 will be used. These platforms allow free hosting
for open source projects.
In conclusion there are no software costs.
3.4.3 Human resources
These, as explained earlier, compromise the bigest part of the budget. Table
3.1 shows the cost for every role that this project needs.
Role Payment (e/h) Hours Total (e)
Project manager 50 70 3500
Software designer 35 80 2800
Software programmer 25 145 3625
Software tester 20 120 2400
Total 415 12325
Table 3.1: Human resources costs per role
3.4.4 Total budget
Using the estimation of costs for every resource we obtain a required budget
no greater than 12400e.
1https://github.com
2https://bitbucket.org
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3.5 Budget control
As we have seen in the previous section, the budget is mainly for the
human resources. Modifications are very improbable because the project is
expected to be doable with very limited hardware specifications and with
free software. Variations could be introduced by increasing the time needed
to finish the project.
Another factor could be an unexpected success of the unobfuscator ser-
vice, which would increase the cost of the server or, more importantly the
maintenance cost of the product.
In conclusion, the budget is low and very stable.
3.6 Sustainability
In this section we are going to evaluate the sustainability of our project in
three different areas: economic area, social area and environmental area.
3.6.1 Economic sustainability
Since we are relying on free and open source libraries and utilities that
depend on foundations and self maintained institutions, the economic sus-
tainability of the project can be guaranteed.
This project is relevant because as we will see can be provide a huge
social impact and it is innovative in the way to process tracking on the
web. This justifies the project.
28
3. Planning 3.6. Sustainability
The project receives an 7 in the economical viability area because its
costs cannot be further optimized, but given that the success of it relies on
that there is enough obfuscation of tracking on the web, there is a certain
degree of risk.
3.6.2 Social sustainability
Although an important part of the public knows that there is tracking on
the web going on, proving that a given service is obfuscating it might create
a huge impact. Also, we expect some impact inside the computer security
research community.
This project receives a 8 in the social sustainability area, since its im-
portance can be huge for the general public, and can affect people’s point
of view.
3.6.3 Environmental sustainability
The project requires minimal resources. We estimate a monthly average
energy consumption of 20kWh, which is equivalent to approximately 15kg
of CO2.
This could increase if the cloud service is a huge success, but a priori
the electricity consumption of the server will not be increased significantly
just by running our instrumented browser.
When possible, we will avoid to print documents on paper and use
digital versions instead.
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This project is awarded a 9 in the environmental sustainability area be-
cause it does not use unnecessary resources, and the required ones are used
in a responsible and efficient manner. Its footprint for the environtment is
very low.
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The methodology we agreed upon with the director consists on a Firefox
plugin that will connect to a running local server, logging every JavaScript
call to the toDataURL function of the HTML5 Canvas element. It will log
information such as display dimensions of the canvas, the full stacktrace to
that call and the current url. We try to detect only canvas fingerprinting
since it’s the easiest of the tracking methods to instrument.
The logger server will process this information and store it in a struc-
tured database, so it can be queried and analyzed later.
The scraper will run an stock version of Firefox with our plugin ins-
talled. It will use the Alexa’s1 list of the top 1 million most visited pages2,
although we will only care about the first 10000. This sample size should be
enough to find if there’s obfuscation in mainstream websites. The scraper
should be implemented in a modular and flexible fashion, so future students
and researchers can add more interactivity with the visited webpages such
as filling forms or clicking certain buttons. We will be using the Selenium
WebDriver 3.
1http://www.alexa.com/topsites
2http://s3.amazonaws.com/alexa-static/top-1m.csv.zip
3http://www.seleniumhq.org/projects/webdriver/
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Figure 4.1: Architecture schema
We will also implement a web service so a visitor can introduce an
URL in a simple form and using this same methodology we will be able to
tell the user if that webpage implements canvas fingerprinting and if it’s
obfuscated.
If we ran the logger in a public server, and made the plugin send its
request to that server, we could distribute the plugin through the Mozilla
addon store and crowdsource the collection of the data more easily. We
won’t do this because of time and budget limitations. We wouldn’t be able
to achieve enough diffusion to make it relevant enough for this project.
4.1 Browser plugin
The plugin basically injects a modified version of the toDataURL method to
every webpage the browser visits. It tries too reduce its footprint removing
itself from the DOM after the injection. This will give us more accurate
stacktrace positions.
There have been some modifications on the original idea. We now
collect the canvas visible size (scrollHeight and scrollWidth) so we
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can filter out false positives. We have to take into account that not all
canvas elements are used for tracking, it has its legit purposes. If the
canvas is smaller than a square with side 16px, we can consider it is being
hidden from the user[27].
Also, we send a snapshot of the whole document to the server in the
moment of the execution. This way we can filter out unobfuscated calls
that are injected to the DOM by third parties. If we analyzed the HTML
document before any J avaScript execution (using a proxy such as mitmdump4
for example) we could potentially have a very high false positive rate. This
presents a major advantage over the original idea.
Our modified toDataURL does the same thing as the original function
(to keep compatibility), but also raises and captures an exception, so we
can get a stacktrace. Then, the information about the canvas and the call
is POSTed to our logging server (normally listening on localhost).
The main gist of the plugin is:
var scriptNode = document.createElement('script');
function instrument() {
var old = HTMLCanvasElement.prototype.toDataURL;
HTMLCanvasElement.prototype.toDataURL = function(c) {
var trace = (new Error).stack;
var xhr = new XMLHttpRequest();
xhr.open("POST", our_server_address, true);
xhr.setRequestHeader("Content-Type", "application/json");
var params = {
w: this.scrollWidth,
4http://docs.mitmproxy.org/en/latest/mitmdump.html
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h: this.scrollHeight,
referrer: document.referrer,
src: window.location.href,
stack: trace,
doc: new XMLSerializer().serializeToString(document),
}
xhr.send(JSON.stringify(params));
return old.apply(this, arguments);
}
var self = document.currentScript;
self.parentNode.removeChild(self);
}
scriptNode.innerHTML = '('+instrument.toString()+')();';
where = document.head || document.body;
if (where) {
where.insertBefore(scriptNode, where.firstChild);
}
We have to note, that if there is no document (where is null and thus
evaluates to false), we are visiting a script that was loaded by an HTML
snippet, and our modified version of toDataURL will already be set up.
4.2 Logger server
The logger is basically a server that binds to an arbitrary address and port
(normally it will be localhost, but this decoupling gives us more flexibility
and reusability) and writes it to an SQLite database. We are using this
database engine so the collected data can be shared simply distributing one
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binary file. Also, since the server is implemented in Python5, that includes
a module for SQLite in the standard library, the setup time was very low
compared to Postgres or MySQL. Basically it is good enough. The server
accesses to the database using an ORM so migrating it to another RDBM
should be doable in the future without many modifications in the server
code if it is required.
Also, since most of the times we are dealing with third parties, we want
to detect if different pages using the same third party, are really using the
same files/code. Ideally we would hash the contents and then we would be
able to compare hashes instead of storing the whole file multiple times.
Figure 4.2: These two files only differ in the timestamp
This is not really feasible. Sometimes, there are slight modifications
such as timestamps or user agent information, that are included dynami-
cally in the response. These modifications don’t change the overall identity
of the file, but a typical hashing function, like any of the SHA family for
example, would not work here, because these small changes produce com-
pletely different hashes (in fact, that’s their purpose). This is why we are
using a locality sensitive hashing algorithm (like the one implemented in
5https://python.org
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tlsh6[29] to better detect file equality.
We decided to use Python for the HTTP server because it is very flexible,
it has a lot of useful libraries and it is very simple yet powerful.
It is important that we implement a valid response with the OPTIONS
method, because since we are connecting to another domain (from the
visited page to ourselves) we want to be CORS7 compliant[30].
As it can be seen in Figure 4.3 the database schema is very simple. We
are just interested in aggregating and storing the data in a structured way.
We want to remark that we are differentiating between the caller (where
the stacktrace ends) and the initiator (where the stacktrace starts). Storing
these makes it easier to detect third parties and who is really responsible
of the call. This information could be extracted later from the also stored
full stacktrace.
4.3 Scraper
The scraper is also a Python script that orchestrates multiple Firefox ins-
tances. It uses the Selenium WebDriver module for python, and runs Fire-
fox with our plugin installed.
It then loads a file containing a list of urls and navigates them one after
the other.
Because it is already using the Selenium WebDriver, in a future it would
be possible to add more functionality such as clicking buttons or filling
forms.
6https://github.com/trendmicro/tlsh
7https://developer.mozilla.org/en/docs/Web/HTTP/Access_control_CORS
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CREATE TABLE domain (
id INTEGER NOT NULL,
domain VARCHAR NOT NULL,
alexa_rank INTEGER NOT NULL,
PRIMARY KEY (id),
UNIQUE (domain)
);
CREATE INDEX ix_domain_alexa_rank ON domain (alexa_rank);
CREATE TABLE log (
id INTEGER NOT NULL,
domain_id INTEGER NOT NULL,
measured_at DATETIME,
canvas_width INTEGER,
canvas_height INTEGER,
referrer VARCHAR,
source_url VARCHAR,
source_html VARCHAR,
source_tlsh VARCHAR,
stacktrace VARCHAR,
st_caller_file VARCHAR,
st_caller_line INTEGER,
st_caller_char INTEGER,
st_caller_tlsh VARCHAR,
st_init_file VARCHAR,
st_init_line INTEGER,
st_init_char INTEGER,
st_init_tlsh VARCHAR,
is_obfuscated BOOLEAN,
PRIMARY KEY (id),
FOREIGN KEY(domain_id) REFERENCES domain (id),
CHECK (is_obfuscated IN (0, 1))
);
Figure 4.3: Database schema
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def build_driver():
fp = webdriver.FirefoxProfile()
fp.add_extension(config.PLUGIN_FILE_PATH)
# To allow connections from https to our localhost
fp.set_preference("security.mixed_content.block_active_content", False)
caps = DesiredCapabilities.FIREFOX
return webdriver.Firefox(firefox_profile=fp, capabilities=caps)
Figure 4.4: This function returns a webdriver that will run Firefox with
our plugin already installed
A page visit is considered complete 15 seconds after the browser fully
loaded the content. This way we will also catch delayed calls or time
triggered events.
The scraper is prepared to be highly parallelizable, but it is not recom-
mended to run a lot of Firefox in a computer with reduced resources.
Figure 4.5: Scraper working on my personal computer
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4.4 Web service
The web service basically runs on a Virtual Private Server everything we
have already described. The only difference is that the scraping process
receives urls remotely on demand. Then the result is displayed to the user
in an informative and readable format.
Figure 4.6: Webservice result display
To make it work on a virtual private server, without a graphical card
and without graphical user interface, some adjustments had to be done.
• The scraper is now a service, listening to what urls to visit.
• The scraper notifies the web service when a certain visit has already
finished.
• The scraper will run the Selenium WebDriver as a server to reduce
browser launching time.
• The web service caches results up to a day, so frequently requested
webpages can have their answer quickly.
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• Firefox runs now on the X virtual framebuffer (xfvb).
Here we can see how implementing the logging server as another service,
helped with the modularity. We didn’t have to modify it at all, only the
behaviour of the client (the scraper).
Although the virtual framebuffer should use more memory than a head-
less version of Firefox, we chose this solution because we don’t expect to
have too many traffic, and it is much simpler to implement.
4.4.1 Security considerations
This service is just a proof of concept of how the developed tools could be
used in different ways. Allowing our users to make our server visit arbitrary
webpages can be a security problem.
Some measures were taken into account, such as:
• The browser is being run by an unpriviliged user.
• This user has very limited resources assigned such as memory, disk
space, and cpu.
• We will clear cookies after the visit has finished
• We will kill the browser instance after certain time automatically
• Only 4 instances of firefox will be running at maximum at any given
time.
• We will cache the results to avoid accessing the same webpage too
many times (although very improbable, we don’t want to be respon-
sible of a DoS attack)
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With this webservice, pages that require a login, will still be inaccessible
for us, since we are only receiving an url as input (not the credentials). This
would be solved if we distributed the plugin and made the logging server
public, but the problem with this approach then would be that we would
have to redact all personal information from the logged HTML, making it
difficult to know what to redact and what not.
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After browsing with our framework the landing page of the 10000 most
visited webpages according to Alexa, these are the obtained results:
A total of 644 (6.4%) diferent pages use canvas fingerprinting as detected
by our methodology. There were 1424 calls detected. Some pages use more
than one tracking service, or a single service sometimes needs more than
one call to create a full fingerprint.
Comparing the tlsh hashes with a threshold of 75 (out of 400, meaning
they are very similar) we get that there are only 90 different files. This is
important to stregthen the fact that most of the tracking is controlled by
a small fraction of third parties.
The most used tracking services that perform a canvas fingerprint are
bktrx.com, doubleverify.com, yandex.ru, alicdn.com, and adnium.
com.
Our results are only slightly different compared to the ones obtained in
previous studies[27].
We can also see the trend of how less popular pages use less tracking.
In the 0-10K range the percentage is about a 5.5%
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Figure 5.1: Tracking bucketed by Alexa rank position
We also observed that the prevalence of lijit.com has gone down in
favor of bktrx.com, used by Microsoft and some of his affiliates.
There was a total of 542 calls that have been excluded since the can-
vas have non-zero width and height (in fact it is 16x16 px) and after fur-
ther manual inspection, it is clear it’s only used to test if the device sup-
ports emojis provided by the wordpress plugin https://wordpress.org/
plugins/wp-emoji-one/.
There are only 97 detected obfuscated calls that originated from 33
different pages. Almost all of them are from third parties (the tracking
code comes from only 21 domains, the most used being js.ad-score.com,
cdn.inaudium.com, and fraudmetrix.cn). The distribution of the rank
of the pages that originated the call can be seen in Figure 5.2
It’s interesting to see that most of the calls come from external scripts,
loaded by the webpage. This being totally dynamic allows much more
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Figure 5.2: Obfuscation bucketed by Alexa rank position
injection control to the advertising provider, making it more dangerous for
the final user.
It is also interesting to note that, the most used tracking providers,
Google Analytics and doubleclick.net1 don’t use canvas fingerprinting, as it
is considered a more intrusive method, and as explained in Online Tracking:
A 1-million-site Measurement and Analysis [27] recent awareness produced
that major advertisers moved away from it.
The whole process of data gathering took almost 20 hours spanning the
17th and 18th of September.
We can conclude that there is obfuscation on only very specific cases.
This can be understood taking into account that most users don’t really
analyze the code, and there exist dynamic tools to avoid it, so the effort
spent on obfuscating is probably not rewarding enough.
1Also owned by Google
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__pm_glbl = {cfg: {server_token:
"6a186ba29d36faad-GkvfPcVjdVPqKDwT3HHJEE0=-E07GOstkbVbnMg==",
host: "js.ad-score.com"}};(function(){function
ea(){for(var
b=a[0],c=0;24>c;c++)b+=a[2][a[1]](Math[a[3]](62*Math[a[4]]()));return
b}function ba(){return Date[a[26]]?Date[a[26]]():(new
Date)[a[27]]()}
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
...
a=["",b("kpizIb",18),
b("OPQRSTUVWXYZABCDEFGHIJKLMNopqrstuvwxyzabcdefghijklmn0123456789",12),
b("qwzzc",15),b("mviyjh",5),
b("__ax_rwmw_",15),b("_",24),b("j",17),b("__tq_kpfp",22),b("jmn",19),
b("iuhluh_jeaud",10),b("EQDHQD_FAWQZ",14),b("mtxy",21),
b("ox.fi-xhtwj.htr",21),b("jlini",6),b("eqqmp",3),b("AFPXYIBA_JLARIBP",3),
b("__he_kwjnwj_lgcwf",8),b("eqdhqd_bmdmye",14),b("buklmpulk",19),
b("tds_iti",25),b("chxyrIz",6),b("gifkfkpgv",9),b("tmvobp",18),
...
Figure 5.3: Excerpt of https://js.ad-score.com/score.min.js, that is
obfuscated
Most webpages delegate the tracking to third parties, and there will be
obfuscation only when they care enough and think that it’s effective.
The whole database can be downloaded at https://bitbucket.org/
aespuna/canvas-tfg/downloads/stats.db.
The number of results and more importantly, the rate is very manage-
able. At first we validated some of the results by hand. This allowed us to
iterate the plugin development, fixing some corner cases, and reducing the
number of false positives, without having to repeat the whole process from
the begining.
The obtained results are somewhat expected and they overlap with
the interpretation of Online Tracking: A 1-million-site Measurement and
Analysis [27].
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6.1 Summary
With this project we proved that tracking is very prevalent today on the
internet. We looked only for a particular technique, and the relative usage
was high enough. Also, even though we discovered some obfuscation, it
cannot be considered that it is being used extensively.
Our opinion is that probably it takes too much work and effort to ob-
fuscate something that nobody will look at. Most of the time minification
is enough to make it unreadable by a human (but preserving the public
calls). The users that don’t want to be tracked are probably already using
a plugin or a set of browser configurations that allow to detect and avoid
being tracked dynamically. That’s why probably distributors don’t care
enough to obfuscate their code. We need to raise awareness, so internet
users can know these tools and protect against tracking using them.
So the best option is to use plugins that find these threats in real time,
and simply avoid executing certain paths on the client browser. A very
good option to protect our privacy is the Tor browser1, that bundles a lot
of privacy protecting plugins.
1https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en
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6.2 Future work
We created an extensible framework that can be used by future students.
A non-extensive list of possible extensions could be:
• Detect obfuscation even if there’s no tracking.
• Add more browsing capabilities such as form filling and button click-
ing, because maybe we lost a big part of the tracking visiting only
the landing page.
• Try detect other tracking techniques (such as evercookies, WebRTC
fingerprinting...) and potentially find obfuscation.
• Distribute the plugin so it can be used by everybody and collect the
data in a public server.
• Write more documentation about some of the parts to make it more
easy to use.
There are still possible performance updgrades for the web service. But
they should be irrelevant once the plugin is publicly distributed.
We could also use our obtained data to make pressure using entities
such as the EFF 2 to show that canvas fingerprinting is still being used,
and help educate the average internet user.
2Electronic Frontier Foundation https://eff.org
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6.3 Personal thoughts
This project was instructive in multiple ways.
It started as a continuation of a master’s final project from another
student, but we quickly changed the approach since a big part of the code
was already outdated. This new approach simplified every piece of the
toolchain, and allowed us get results faster. I had to develop little pieces
that were glued together at the end, and that is always satisfying.
Getting to know more about the internals of the web and its ecosystem
was something I had interest on, and this project allowed me to work on
it.
The only thing I regret is not finishing it earlier due to my professional
needs. The 7-months delay was the worst part of the project. I had to adapt
and work hard during this summer to be able to finish it. It was mentally
exhausting to not be able to spend all the required time at the begining
and knowing it would be delayed, but I didn’t want to lose the opportunity
and the advisor was very understanding about the whole situation.
At the end I can say I’m proud of the result. I hope it will be useful for
a future student or researcher.
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